How to fight the Naxals may be a dilemma for the state but it must be resolved.
By Amir Ullah Khan
Is the Naxalite problem a simple law and order issue? Should the biggest threat that India faces be put down by using the police and the military? Or do we look at this more as a larger concern that goes beyond a security threat into developmental, sociological and historical analysis? Victor Hugo’s ethical dilemma comes to life again. Do we look at someone who flouts society’s laws as a criminal who must be punished or as a reflection of what is wrong with the entire social structure that pushes people to crime and violence? This debate is raging again, soon after a large bunch of an elite police force gets gunned down in the Dantewada forests of Chattisgarh. When the Punjab problem raged in the early eighties, we had first faced this dilemma. Does the Indian military march in and annihilate the enemy who is our citizen too? The same debate when handling the situation in Kashmir. However we have seen in all such cases that the police do move in, usually taking help from the armed forces and then the democratic process comes on. In the Naxalite case, why is the approach now hesitant? Why do we want to tackle what is criminal and hostile using the police force? Is it that we don’t think a green hunt for this group can ever be successful? Or is this indeed a set of people who need to be understood, negotiated with and won over?
More than 45 per cent of all adivasis or indigenous people live below the poverty line. Some states are however particularly worse off. For example, in Orissa over 72 per cent of all adivasi live well below the poverty line. Inadequate understanding, faulty policy and rampant corruption coupled with a lack of backward integration of Indian industry in a country where agriculture continues to be rain fed (single crop) and characterized by marginal holdings and low productivity. The service sector is practically non-existent.
Even basic infrastructure is mostly non-existent. The result has been vast areas of backwardness, divested from the India growth story. Most of these least economically developed districts are in central and eastern India, covered largely by forests on top and blessed with vast mineral resources underneath.
These areas are home to Naxalites, with a reputation for extreme violence and are also easily counted amongst the poorest of the poor, although the lands they live on are rich and coveted. These areas are also often referred to as the “Red Corridor” or Compact Revolutionary Zone, signifying the substantial influence of left extremism there. The Prime Minister described this as the “single biggest security challenge” to the country and stressed on a two pronged strategy – effective policing and accelerated socio-economic development programmes. Strangely, in recent times many innocent victims were killed by the Naxalites in the most despicable manner including repeated stabbing and slitting of the victims’ throats in front of other hostages or villagers after trial in so called Jana Adalats, or people’s courts.
Micro-level socio-economic intervention to alleviate the plight of the poor and who are mostly tribals has never happened. The bureaucratic or law and order machinery has been conspicuous by its absence in these areas where blatant apathy and corruption has been the hallmark of any implementation programme or the meagre government presence. The police, forest and excise departments are hated and this is just about all the government the common people encounter. The ‘Red Corridor’ is a terrain that is forested and endowed with rich mineral resources. As a result forest based industries like paper and mineral based heavy industries like iron and steel will come up in these geographical locations. What is remarkable about this area is that not all districts were affected by Left extremism: Certain regions within a state, essentially on the inter-state borders, usually having a hilly and rough terrain, and largely being forested rural areas were the ones most affected by Left extremism. Few districts were wholly and most were partially under the influence of Left extremism and their violent terror tactics. Urban areas were by and large not affected by Left extremism, even if they were in Naxalite affected districts. Business and investments were being carried on usually in the non-affected areas in every respect. The influence of Naxalism has been in rural areas and in certain districts or areas within these districts.
Naxalism has been spreading in some six states but also loosing ground in the other three. In West Bengal, the number of police stations identified as Maoist-infested in 2003 was four. This increased to six in 2004 and seven in 2005. By 2006 a total of 12 police stations were identified as Maoist-infested. Presently the state administration identifies 14 police stations to be so affected. Thus since 2003 there has been a sudden spurt in Maoist activity and presence in West Bengal, the intensity heightening in the last couple of years. In both Orissa and Chattisgarh Maoists have been spreading their activities in new areas during the period 2003 to 2006, but the increase has been marginal. In comparison, the other three Maoist-infested states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand dealt with the problem efficiently. These states not only stopped the spread of Naxalite violence but also “recaptured” some areas where Maoists had earlier made their presence felt. In Andhra Pradesh, the total number of Maoist-infested police stations were 183 in 2003 but it came down to 93 in 2006. Similarly in Bihar, the number of Maoist-infested police stations came down from 100 to 69 in the same period. Jharkhand also dealt with the problem efficiently. In 2003, the state had 96 affected police stations in terms of Maoist violence but in 2006 the number came down to 85.
In terms of violence, in 2007, till the end of November, there were 1385 incidents of Naxalite violence as against 1389 during the corresponding period in 2006; 214 police personnel have been killed as against 133 in the corresponding period in 2006; 418 civilians have been killed as against 501 in the corresponding period of 2006. In 2007, till the end of November, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand together accounted for 68.16% of the total incidents and 76.42% of the total casualties. Higher number of incidents and casualties in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are mainly due to increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and landmines by Naxalites, attacks on security forces, killings of people who resist Naxalite atrocities/ extortion/ violence and continuous counter-operations by security forces against Naxalites. Finally deciphering of sophisticated as well as small firearms with Maoists highlighted their easy access to such sources as well as their financial strength. A suitable or adequate response to the Naxalite problem is still to be framed. This has enabled the transformation of the Naxalite problem in to large scale insurgency movement. The weapons used in the recent attacks have grown more sophisticated. All these require steady access to financial resources. The Naxal movement relies on the strategy of building parallel governments, capturing resource bases and extorting a percentage of the money flow in all business or developmental forays.
Take the case of Orissa today to understand the ground situation. In Orissa, 12,000 out of 30,000 posts in the police are vacant, and in three districts they have stopped wearing their uniforms. Orissa police lack critical infrastructure and manpower to check the mounting Maoist influence and capacities. While the state police headquarters feel that Orissa currently requires around 1,000 police stations, it currently has just 482, and most of these lack proper infrastructure and manpower. The Orissa police also currently has over 12,000 vacancies against the present sanctioned strength of 30,265.
While about 10,000 vacancies are among constables and other ranks, there are also a large proportion of vacancies in the middle-rung leadership at the assistant sub-inspector (ASI), sub-inspector (SI) and inspector levels. According to sources, as many as 360 ASI posts, 905 SI posts and 43 posts of inspectors have been vacant for the past several years constituting a 22 per cent vacancy against the sanctioned strength. Drumming up a sense of crisis has become an integral part of the efforts at ‘resource mobilisation’ in this broad enterprise, and that is why the ‘developmental solution’ to Naxalism finds such strong advocacy among political leaders and state bureaucracies everywhere.
The Centre now underwrites virtually all security related expenditure in Maoist afflicted states, providing support for police modernisation and force augmentation. Yet, states fail to create the necessary capacities to counter the Maoist threat. Even where significant disbursal of such funds occurs, their utilisation remains inefficient, and diversion to other, often unauthorised uses, is endemic.