‘Pakistan is authoritarian via its military…’

It would have been a relief for Pakistan’s military establishment if Dr Ayesha Siddiqa had pursued her first love, flying airplanes, instead of becoming a security analyst and turning to writing on the subject. Her second book* Military Inc (2007) drove former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to ban its launch in Pakistan, allegedly harass her and even go on television to accuse her of conspiring with India’s RAW to destroy the military in Pakistan. Military Inc examines the link between the military and the political/civil sector in which the military becomes so powerful that it not only affects political decision making but even distorts it. Using Pakistan as a ‘case study’ in the book, Ayesha expounds her theory that when a powerful military expands its economic power and goes beyond budgetary allocations it has an impact on State policies. Speaking to CURRENT, she emphasized that political power and economic power are entwined and both flow out of each other.

After the ouster of the General Pervez Musharraf and the election of Asif Ali Zardari as the new President of Pakistan, India has apprehensions about the future of the ongoing peace talks between the two countries. Certain quarters in the Indian establishment felt that General Musharraf, though a military man and not really a political leader, was the best bet when it came to solving the Kashmir issue. How do you see this?
Ultimately, it is a democratic set-up in Islamabad that will deliver when it comes to changing the relationship between India and Pakistan. Only a democratically elected government can muster the popular support to change the tenor of the relationship. Civilians in Pakistan do not want continuation of tension. Let us not forget that political leaders and not military generals have earlier tried to improve relations with India on their own and not under any external pressure as Musharraf did. He started the Composite Dialogue with India only after losing a war and coming under international pressure to start talks with India.

In your view, the army in Pakistan does not want peace with India?
India is the raison d’etre for the military in Pakistan. It justifies its economic power by projecting itself as the state’s protector in the context of India. It is in the interest of the military in Pakistan to keep the India issue alive. For the military generals and dictators the main constituency is the military. They are less inclined than political leaders to change the complexion of the relationship with India.

By that argument, New Delhi should see Islamabad deliver when it comes to the war on terror and cross-border terrorism, which according to India has been used by Pakistan so far as a foreign policy tool.
For the democratically elected governments on both sides there is the issue of legitimacy. They perceive their legitimacy as linked to what they do on Kashmir. Just as political parties in India cannot be seen as taking any action which will be perceived — more so as your general elections draw closer — as compromising India’s position vis-a-vis Pakistan, there too political liberals face the same problem. India should recognize this important fact. At present, there is a tussle between the political government in Pakistan and the military. The elected government there is asserting itself while the military is trying to build its image as the protector. If the war on our northern front or the US-Pakistan confrontation of sorts over there continues, the military gets legitimacy and will emerge the victor in this tussle. It will pitch itself as the one which fights against American dominance and surely return to govern. Zardari will have to make moves keeping these factors in mind. To undo the power of the military, the political leadership in Pakistan will have to improve relations with India. Zardari can deliver only if India exhibits greater confidence in him. Hawks in India believe that it is Pakistan that has to solve the issue. India too has to reciprocate even if it is on an issue unlinked with Kashmir, like for example Siachen. Otherwise it will not be doable for Zardari.

New Delhi finds that post-Musharraf, multiple power centres have emerged in Pakistan. This makes it difficult for it to take forward the talks and expect positive results. In that context, it found it more meaningful to talk to the general.
I am amazed at the hypocrisy of the Indian elite. If they can deal with different poles of contact in other parts of the world and multiple power centres in other countries, then why not in Pakistan?

As a security analyst how do you explain the power the military exercises in Pakistan? There have been brave efforts to usher in democracy but democratic governments are short-lived in Islamabad. It is like a yo-yo there when it comes to civilian rule and military rule.
All militaries have an un-satiated desire for power. But if the political and civil set-up is powerful and stable it can contain this and the military remains under control. In Pakistan over 50 years there has developed a nexus between political power and military power because the military has expanded its economic power. It has evolved as an independent class and become an actor in the power structure in Pakistan. Political scientist Hamza Alavi (Pakistan) in his theory (1980s) points out that business is stronger than the political sector in Pakistan and the ruling elite is made up of the landed feudal class, the indigenous bourgeois and the metropolitan bourgeois (those who bring in foreign capital). I have taken this theory forward and added the military with its economic interests, which is independent of all others and defends its interests at the cost of political development. The benefits of ‘Milbus’ (military economy) is the military fraternity which is constituted of serving and retired military officers. In Pakistan, ‘Milbus’ is part of the elite economy.

The people of Pakistan have repeatedly shown a desire for democracy so why does it elude them ever so often?
It is because of this that military rulers and dictators try to gain democratic legitimacy just as General Musharraf tried. There is an intrinsic partnership between civilian rulers and the military. The first martial rule was brought in by a civilian in 1958. About 10 days after Ghulam Mohammad. took over, the military (Ayub Khan) stepped in and wrested control. The civilian partners give the military rulers their legitimacy. Once they lose this legitimacy they get pushed back. But one has to understand that since Pakistan’s inception its political class has been very weak. It too has been authoritarian and uses force. India is authoritarian via its civil bureaucracy. Pakistan is authoritarian via its military.

* Dr Siddiqa’s first book Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup from 1979 to 1999: In Search of a Policy was published in 2001

Scholarly background

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa is a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., teaching political economy and history of Pakistan. She is also a Ford Fellow and was the ‘Pakistan Scholar’ at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at Washington, DC for 2004-05. She has contributed to the Journal for Defence and Peace Economics, Jane’s Defence Weekly and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

She got her doctorate from King’s College, London in 1996 and has worked on issues varying from military technology, defense decision-making, nuclear deterrence, arms procurement, arms production to civil-military relations in South Asia. She was a civil servant for 11 years, during which she was asked to work as the director of naval research with the Pakistan navy, making her the first civilian and a woman to work at that position in Pakistan’s defense establishment. She also worked as a deputy director in Audit Defence Services, Lahore Cantonment.